ABSTRACT | Hurricanes produce significant, widespread, and often prolonged electrical-power outages. For example, Hurricane Irene caused more than 500 000 Long Island Power Authority customers to lose power and it took eight days to achieve 99% customer restoration. Individuals and businesses are heavily dependent on a continuous supply of electricity.
I. IN T RODUC T ION
Business and household consumers of electric power are increasingly reliant on a constant flow of electricity even following severe hazards such as hurricanes and ice storms. In a recent study, 62% of respondents say compensation of $500 would not suffice for a two-day outage [1] . This expectation of uninterrupted service is expected to continue as facets of the transportation and heating infrastructure are added to the grid to utilize decarbonized energy [2] . Despite this, not all service providers offer similar levels of reliability following these hazards. The prevailing wisdom assumes that differences among utilities' performance stem from either the unique characteristics of the recent hazard or managerial differences that guide system-wide hardening and restoration decisions [3] , [4] . While these are likely significant factors, it does not fully explain differences among utilities operated by the same electric-holding company, differences between adjacent utilities, and differences within a service area. For example, adjacent utilities, which presumably experience many similar hazards due to spatial proximity, can have vastly different SAIFI and SAIDI index values when major events are considered [5] .
This paper focuses on how factors other than managerialdriven decisions and unique aspects of the hazards may affect the reliability of utilities. Specifically, this paper explores impacts from hurricanes and how customer expectation of reliable power and behavioral response to sustained outages may create a dynamic feedback loop that forces change and affects the overall reliability. This study is limited to customers either purchasing a generator or filing a complaint, with the latter being an effective strategy for system improvement should a sufficient number of people complain. It is possible that customers do both, though it is more likely that customers with generators do not file a complaint and thereby reduce the demand for system hardening now and in the future. In this paper, system hardening is assumed to be the process whereby an electric-power utility makes an investment in the system to reduce its vulnerability to damage in future events. This could include measures such as raising substations, undergrounding lines, and replacing poles with ones that can withstand greater wind loading.
The hazard explored in this paper is hurricanes, for two reasons. The first is because they can cause widespread and prolonged outages. Hurricane Sandy 1 caused more than 8 million outages and nearly 10% of those outages persisted for more than one week [6] . Sustained outages directly attributed to at least nine deaths for reasons including carbon monoxide poisoning, falls due to darkness, and inoperable oxygen machines [7] . Generators were sold out and some utilities were required to invest heavily in hardening afterward. The second reason is more banal. Models that forecast localized hazards generated by hurricanes (e.g., wind speed) are sufficiently advanced to characterize the risk of an outage in a localized region (e.g., census-tract level). While hurricanes are the focus of this work, the methodology and insights could also be applied to other wide-scale spatial disasters, such as ice storms, as the methodology continues to advance [8] .
The objective of this work is to close a feedback loop in electric-power utility system reliability modeling by incorporating customer behavioral response. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first work to do so. This is done through an integrated power-outage-prediction and agent-based model that uses a probabilistically consistent synthetic hurricane generation model to create a tunable hurricane environment. The hypothesis is that seemingly minor adjustments to how customers respond and their tolerances to outages may aggregate to system-wide changes that affect regional power reliability. Through this, the research explores how different trajectories of power system reliability may emerge over time.
The model presented in this paper is quantitative, and its structure is heavily informed by social science studies of behavioral responses to natural hazards. The model highlights the value of interdisciplinary work by bringing new understanding and perspective. As such, the paper contributes to the literature in the following ways: 1) it provides an alternative explanation for regional disparities in power system reliability; 2) it develops an integrated model for combining both outage forecasting and behavioral responses; 3) it tests the implications of climate change scenarios and policy interventions on grid reliability; 4) it builds a realistic case study using open-source parcel data from over 357 000 State of Maryland electric-power customers; and last, 5) it demonstrates the value of interdisciplinary modeling.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides an overview of relevant literature, including a discussion of the relevance of behavioral response to hazards, outage forecast modeling, and agent-based modeling. Section III presents the methodology, and a case study is provided in section IV. The fifth section concludes with insights, limitations, and next steps.
II. LITER AT U R E
The model presented in Section III is grounded in an agentbased simulation that integrates components of both outages forecasting and behavioral response.
A. Electric-Power Outage Modeling
Knowing the likely extent of outages in the hours and days prior to a hurricane provides a significant advantage to those overseeing emergency response and recovery. It guides decision makers on where to open shelters and utilities on where to preposition mobile assets so power can promptly be restored, along with a host of other benefits. As such, there has been a significant push toward a priori prediction of electric-power outages in advance of a disaster. Typically, the predictions are updated when the hurricane tracks are updated, which typically happens every six hours. The two general approaches are: network models and predictive statistical and data modeling. The first uses topographical or network flow models with sets of supply and demand nodes to predict which nodes will have unmet demand when nodes or links are removed [9] - [11] . For reasons particularly linked to model size, scaling, and data requirements, this type of modeling tends to be at the transmission level. Fortunately, transmission lines tend to fare well during hurricanes whereas components at the distribution level tend to fail and cause the vast majority of outages.
Statistical approaches and data mining methods for predicting outages have made significant advances in the past decade and, with sufficient training data, they can offer estimates that are more spatially detailed than those described above [12] . Liu et al. developed the first statistical outage prediction model using generalized linear models along with the 1 The name "Hurricane Sandy" is used throughout this paper. The storm merged with a nontropical system, and its proper name is subject to debate.
hurricane's track to estimate outages [13] , [14] . However, the model was evaluated based on fit and not predictive accuracy, in part because some covariates were hurricane specific indicator variables. Han et al. developed and validated a predictive outage forecasting model that relied on a bevy of utilityspecific spatial information [15] , [16] . Unfortunately, much of these data are not widely available, reducing the model's direct applicability for other utilities and regions. Nateghi et al. expanded upon these methods by comparing them to the predictive performance of other regressing and data mining methods [12] . This work demonstrated how flexible ensemble-based statistical models offer superior predictive accuracy. Quiring et al. used classification and regression trees to evaluate the role of soil moisture and land cover in outage modeling [17] . These studies later informed Nateghi et al. and Guikema et al. which showed that strong predictive accuracy could be achieved by using a random forest model and only public data that are available in advance of an approaching storm [18] , [19] . These prediction models have been validated using extensive out-of-sample testing and Guikema et al. is used to estimate the likelihood of power outages at a census tract level in the model present in Section III [19] .
B. Downstream Effects of Electric-Power Outages
Historically, the research on the impacts of sustained outages focused on cost. Wacker and Billinton reviewed different methodologies for assessing cost of interruption for electric-power customers [21] . They conclude that despite reasonable methodologies being available, insufficient data prevent accurate estimates. Essentially, too few regions have experienced prolonged, repeated outage events and the cost depends on many factors, including location and demographics. Since 1989, however, there has been a tenfold increase in the number of major outage events-defined as having 50 000+ customers without power-in the United States, providing significantly more data [22] . More recently, the interruption cost modeling has focused on improved localized, temporal, and sector-specific estimates [23] - [26] . While interruption costs and willingness to pay are good indicators for the impacts of outages, the range of effects is much wider. From a critical services perspective, the loss of power for a dependent infrastructure system (e.g., telecommunications) can set a cascade of failures into motion, leaving customers both without power and other critical services [27] , [28] . Only recently, however, has the research perspective on the impacts of outages been broadened to consider human welfare, coping, and behavioral response, though its study is still nascent and geographically limited.
Researchers have repeatedly shown that how individuals respond to a hazard affects the regional risk landscape under similar events in the future [29] - [31] . Responses can be complex and range from doing nothing to moving out of the hazard zone, and everything in between. That which motivates these responses is perhaps even more complex, though outside the scope of this paper [32] , [33] . Generally, when individuals perceive a high likelihood of large consequences, they are more likely to mitigate or demand information on how to prepare for the next event [34] . Severe consequences from some hazards have emboldened citizens to unite their grievances and either demand corrective action from regulators or undertake wide-scale mitigation measures themselves. For example, Neef et al. [35] present a case study of farmers in flood-prone North Thailand who united in widening the local riverbed to reduce the likelihood of severe flooding in the future. In a separate case, numerous denials of flood insurance claims led many Hurricane Sandy victims to complain to reporters and congressional representatives. The federal investigation that resulted highlighted a myriad of problems facing the Federal Flood Insurance Program and may be a step toward changing how individuals are insured for floods in the United States [36] . These examples highlight why studying a system in isolation without considering how humans may intervene and alter the system may underestimate or overestimate the risk.
A power outage may induce a variety of behavioral responses. Some people may do nothing, either because the outage does not bother them, or because they do not have the ability to do anything [2] . Those who perceive the likelihood of outages to be high in the future may purchase generators depending on affordability. General trends in generator ownership are unknown and likely geographically dependent. One study grounded in interviews in rural United Kingdom reported relatively few respondents using or purchasing a generator [2] . This is consistent with other studies based in Scandinavia, which suggest residents in rural regions are more likely to report that outages are expected and manageable [37] , [38] . Tendencies toward purchasing generators may differ in the United States. 15% of homes have either portable or standby generators, and the sales of generators grew 45% in 2012-a year that witnessed over 120 major outage events [39] . Anecdotally, a run on generators is typically seen in the days before and after a hurricane and a search in Google Trends for the term "personal generator" was 20 times higher in the days after Hurricane Sandy than the month prior. The actions of others in the community may either encourage or discourage mitigation. This phenomenon is consistently witnessed in the flooding and other natural hazards literature [33] , [40] , and there is little reason to believe it would not occur with generators. The consensus is that by mitigating, an agent is implicitly conveying information to their neighbors that their risk is sufficiently high to take action [33] . This may induce others to mitigate as well. On the other hand, an individual with a generator may exert social altruism and become the beacon for his or her neighborhood, with neighbors visiting to cook food or power electrics [2] . The authors suppose that it may create a free rider effect, in which neighbors are dissuaded from purchasing generators themselves [41] .
There is some evidence that collective action has forced hardening of utilities. For example, based on complaints, the American Customer Satisfaction Index ranked Pepco, the regional electric-power supplier for Washington, DC and surrounding counties as the "most hated company in America" in 2011-a feat given its relatively small customer base compared to more national brands [42] . As a condition for its 2016 merger with Exelon, Pepco must achieve aggressive reliability targets by 2020 [43] .
There is an inherent dichotomy between participating in collective action and individual mitigation. That which one chooses is many times aligned with whether one views mitigation as a personal or governmental responsibility [44] . When large-scale mitigation is conducted, individuals are often deterred from mitigating locally [45] . The perception is typically that their risk has been reduced. Those who do mitigate individually, which can be expensive, are less likely to participate in the collective action. When that occurs, large-scale mitigation efforts to may be less likely to occur and create risk disparities that are based on income [46] .
Finally, it is possible that customers who experience an outage request information about the situation. This has been seen after other hazards [34] . Information dissemination by a community can affect residents' perceptions of risk as well as their perception of how they can manage and mitigate risk on an individual level. Improved provision of information can better prepare households for natural hazard events [47] . A study by Ludy and Kondolf [48] indicates that informed individuals are more likely to take preventative action than uninformed individuals. Information sources and availability are prominent components of an individual's response to natural hazards, playing a part in both the perception of risk and in the behavioral response to risk [49] . The mechanism that spurs mitigation is more complex and dependent on a host of factors.
Practically, an information campaign could inform residents of the closest shelters. This is especially necessary when extreme heat or cold accompanies the storm. Alternatively, an information campaign could inform residents on how likely prolonged outages are and how to survive a sustained outage. This is crucial in hard-to-access rural regions and for customers reliant on power for life-sustaining machines. To the best of the authors' knowledge, there is no research examining the effectiveness of information campaigns that raise awareness of prolonged electric-power outages.
C. Agent-Based Modeling for Extreme Events
Agent-based models (ABMs) are simulation models that include decision-making entities called agents in addition to stochastic elements [50] - [52] . The agents are autonomous and heterogeneous, and can have distinct learning rules, behavioral rules, and history. The agents can interact with each other and with their environment. ABMs are typically used to explain rather than predict, and can be used to simulate the emergence of system-level properties [53] , [54] . ABMs are particularly powerful in domains such as the one present in the paper, ones that lack data sources and contain complex social interactions [54] . Sensitivity analyses are useful and important to understand the potential impacts of uncertain model parameters and rules on ABM output.
ABMs have been used to simulate natural hazard response, wherein individual behavior is a key driver of collective outcomes. For instance, Dawson et al. developed an ABM to simulate vulnerability to coastal flooding in light of different storm surge conditions, evacuation strategies, and flood warning times [55] . Chen et al. used agent-based simulation to study hurricane evacuation in the Florida Keys [56] . Other studies have also generated agent-based simulations of urban and coastal evacuation under varying situations [57] - [59] . This study focuses on longer term responses and mitigation action in reaction to hurricane power outages.
The insights provided by ABMs, regardless of the topic, must be qualified by the learning and behavioral assumptions employed. Modeling human behavior is challenging at best because individuals have differing prior beliefs, experiences, preferences, cognitive abilities, and so on. The goal of capturing behavior is not to precisely mimic behavior or to forecast how the system will act. Rather it is to understand how the strength of assumptions, preferences, beliefs, etc., may inform the results and to identify traits that could lead to superior outcomes. This can only be accomplished with rigorous sensitivity analyses. From a policy perspective, this could aid in identifying which aspects of behavior are most important for some systems, and the direction that policy-makers may want to "nudge" some individuals, and by how much, to improve outcomes.
To that end, the authors have identified three general classes of models that incorporate behavior in ABMs. The first group are "perfect world" behavioral models. These models are more prescriptive than they are descriptive and indeed not likely to be empirically valid in any meaningful way. As an example, Bayesian learning models, where parameters that support a distribution are updated after some experience, fall into this category (e.g., see [66] ). These are reasonable models, and in a "perfect world," individuals would use their entire experience to parameterize reasonable distributions over possible future events and then act in their best interest. We know from observation though that people do not always act in this manner, which is why it is important to compare these "perfect world" models with more descriptive models, and then to measure the implications of being wrong. An example of this approach is provided in Section IV-B.
The second class of models are simple "if-then" models, which make reasonable inferences about causes and effects but do not attempt to characterize any underlying process. This model type may be probabilistic. For example, "If the power goes out, then I will buy a generator with a likelihood of x %." This is then followed by rigorous sensitivity analyses. These models are typically intuitive, or at least empirically observed, and not subjected to validation per se. Despite not being grounded in the most recent scientific advances in behavioral modeling, trends still emerge which indicate the relative importance of preferences. Berglund [54] and Epstein [61] provide examples of this type of approach. The final class of models is supported by recent significant advances in behavioral sciences. This has resulted in numerous frameworks for learning, behavior, and decision making under uncertainty. Many have had elements validated but none are (arguably) universally more valid than others. This class of models tends to address more of the intricate relationships between causes and effects and the limitations of humans themselves. How one would accurately parameterize many of these models is up for debate, which demonstrates, again, the importance of sensitivity analyses. All of the classes are plausible depending on the problem, and each has unique strengths and limitations. Aspects of all model classes exist in the methodology that follows.
D. Alternative Approaches for Modeling Complex Systems With Many Agents
Agent-based modeling is among the many mathematical modeling methods for shedding light on complex systems, especially in the arena of policy and resilience. Broadly, the field can be divided into bottom-up approaches, which include simulation and agent-based models discussed above, and top-down approaches, which include optimization, economic, and other methods. An advantage to simulation methods is that unique behaviors can be assigned to each agent. However, this behavioral assignment could be imprecise, making sensitivity analysis crucial. Examples of bottom-up simulation methods that quantify regional vulnerability and that are not explicitly agent-based models include [62] and [63] .
Top-down approaches typically assign the same reasonable behavior to all agents (e.g., cost minimizers), in part to add model tractability. These models may use optimization to identify optimal strategies given some resilience or other policy objectives (e.g., [64] and [65] ). Performance and data analysis methods, such as data envelopment analysis and input-output models, are useful for evaluating high-level impacts of policies (e.g., [4] and [66] ). In many of these models, agents can be fully strategic, meaning that they can anticipate the effects of their choices on others (e.g., how the decision to purchase insurance affects the insurance market's exposure [65] , [67] ). As we begin to more fully understand human behavioral responses to risk, complex system modeling will continue to advance. Fig. 1 provides an illustrative overview of the integrated outage prediction and agent-based model. First, a library of synthetic tracks is produced for the study area. Storms are generated in the following manner. A starting location and wind speed for a storm are randomly selected in proportion to the historical spatial and wind speed distributions of storms at landfall, respectively. Track data from historic storms are collected and used to train a random forest model that predicts a storm's movement in 6-h increments. This predicts the storm's path. The Kaplan and DeMaria hurricane decay model is then employed to parametrically reduce wind speeds for each 6-h increment [60] . Next, any storm track that does not produce significant winds in the study area (i.e., winds of tropical storm strength or below) is discarded. This step concludes by using a parametric downscaling model that interpolates the 6-h hurricane track and intensity into 3-s peak wind gusts for the centroid of each census tract [68] , [69] . These wind speeds are used to predict the fraction of customers to lose power and comprise the synthetic hurricane library. In sum, 32 000 synthetic hurricanes tracks are produced and range in intensity between tropical storms and Category 5 storms in the study area. Hurricanes are not chosen randomly from this library but rather in proportion to the frequency and intensity parameters set by the model later.
III. MET HODOLOGY
Using the historical storm data set, the peak wind speed from each storm in the area is used to parameterize a Weibull distribution. This distribution reflects the historical distribution of storm intensity in the study area. Additionally, the mean number of historical storms to affect the study region in a given year is used to parameterize a Poisson distribution. This distribution is sampled to determine the number of hurricanes to occur in a given year. While there is tremendous uncertainty in how climate change will affect hurricane frequency and intensity, the general consensus is that they are likely to become less frequent though more intense in the Atlantic basin [70] . As such, during sensitivity analysis, the mean of the Weibull distribution is rightshifted by up to 40% to reflect a more intense environment. The Poisson parameter is also increased or decreased to reflect different frequency scenarios, in a manner similar to Staid et al. [71] .
The integrated outage prediction and agent-based model then begins. First, tolerance thresholds are set for the parameters that induce agents into action. Details of these thresholds are discussed throughout this subsection. Additionally, parameters that support an agent's categorically distributed beliefs about experiencing no, one, or more than one outage in any given year are assigned. These parameters are Dirichlet distributed and updated throughout the run. Noninformative priors are used in the current model. The model then starts in year one and no agents are assumed to own a generator at this time. The Poisson frequency distribution is sampled to determine the number of hurricanes to occur in the year. If no hurricanes occur, the model advances to updated beliefs on the likelihood of an outage. If one or more hurricanes occur, the Weibull intensity distribution is sampled to assign a regional peak wind speed for each hurricane. The hurricane(s) with the maximum centroid wind speed that is closest to the sample wind speed is then selected from the library and a peak 3-s wind speed is assigned to each census tract. Next, the outageprediction model is used to translate those wind speeds into the number of customers within each census that are likely to lose power using the random forest model of Guikema et al. [19] . This model has been validated using extensive out-of-sample testing. Each agent residing within each census track is then probabilistically assigned an outage proportional to the fraction of customers to lose power in that census tract. Those agents who experience an outage but possess a generator are included in the customers without power count; this count is an indicator of utility's reliability. A separate tally records how many agents own a generator. Agents' recent outage experiences then induce learning in a manner similar to [72] . The Dirichlet conjugate priors, which reflect each agent's experience up to that point, are updated in the typical Bayesian manner to include their outage experience in that year. Each agent has a different simulated experience, meaning they each may have different beliefs over their outages likelihoods. This learning model is representative of a "perfect world" class of models where agents use all experiential data to methodically inform beliefs. In Section IV-B, this Bayesian model is compared with an availability bias model, which limits the amount of information agents use to when forming beliefs.
The decision portion of the model then begins. Most of the decision rules take an "if-then" approach and are based on reasonable assumptions and observed behavior of individuals after hurricanes. Ultimately, each agent is assigned an action based on his or her experience during the storm, the experience of people within his or her neighborhood, and beliefs. An agent without a generator may purchase one, file a complaint, or do nothing. Two scenarios, the baseline and neighbor scenario, are considered for purchasing a generator. In the first scenario, an agent will buy a generator if he or she does not have one, can afford one, possesses a sufficiently high expectation for the likelihood of future outages, and is sufficiently confident that one outage or more than one outage will occur. Confidence is the ratio of the variance to the mean of the posterior Dirichlet belief parameters. When this ratio is small, the agent is more confident. The second scenario tests the influence of neighbors. The same purchasing conditions from the baseline scenario are applied. In addition, an agent will buy a generator if no neighbors within "extension cord length" (i.e., 15 m) have a generator, but at least some fraction of neighbors within 100 m have a generator. This reflects the logic where an agent who mitigates encourages neighbors to mitigate as well by implicitly sharing information about their risk. This phenomenon has been empirically observed in flood mitigation [73] and evacuation in anticipation of a hurricane [74] and it is highly reasonable to assume it would happen to some degree in this setting. However, agents within extension cord length (15 m in this case) are less likely to purchase a generator because they can free ride. Power-sharing is consistently observed after major outage events, from NYC urbanites who shared power with neighbors to power cell-phones after Hurricane Sandy [75] to Chicago suburbanites who share power with neighbors to power sump-pumps after heavy thunderstorms [76] . The intent is rarely to power an entire house, but rather critical electronics (e.g., cellphones, freezers, health-monitoring devices). Some news outlets even encourage power sharing as a means to make amends with the often-troubling buzzing that accompanies generators [77] . As such, in the neighbor scenario, those agents buy a generator only if the baseline scenario conditions are met and they have relied their neighbor's power often in recent history. The neighbor scenario and the baseline scenario are ultimately compared to understand whether power-sharing could impact system reliability.
The cost of filing a complaint is relatively low compared to the cost of purchasing a generator, and generally consists of the time needed to make the actual filing. As such, the personal barriers to filing a complaint are low. An agent without a generator files a complaint when they believe their likelihood of losing power is sufficiently high or if they have experienced a significant number of outages recently.
An agent with a generator is most likely to do nothing; after all, they have power. There is a possibility that an agent with a generator files a complaint if a sufficient fraction of his or her neighbors lose power. If most neighbors lose power, this suggests that the agent likely lost power too and is running a generator. Practically, this is a nuisance because many generators require fuel, the generator may not provide enough electricity to power the entire demand, and neighbors may take advantage of this power supply, as discussed above.
If a sufficient fraction of agents complain, regulators take action. Regulators may either issue an information campaign or force the utility to harden its system so outages are less likely in the future. An information campaign is triggered when a certain fraction of agents file a complaint and is modeled in the following manner. First, a separate model that uses the same frequency and intensity parameters and synthetic hurricane library is used to estimate each agent's true likelihood of losing power. This is done by simulating a 100 000-year synthetic record while assuming agents do not make changes to the system. Once complete, a categorical distribution over the likelihood of experiencing no, one, or more than one outage in any given year is calculated for each agent. This is an agent's true outage likelihood. This is saved and rerun only when the system is hardened or different intensity and frequency parameters are used. Second, agents' beliefs on the likelihood of outages are updated. An effective information campaign adjusts the parameters of the Dirichlet priors so that the categorical distribution over their beliefs of an outage is equivalent to their true likelihood of an outage. A less effective information campaign will adjust the parameters of Dirichlet priors by some fraction so that their beliefs over outages is a weighted average of the true outage likelihood and the beliefs held by the agents previously.
If a sufficient fraction of customers lose power or if a sufficient fraction files a complaint to the regulatortwo forces that are inherently interwoven-the utility is required to harden its system. Practically, a utility that hardens may trim trees, underground distribution lines, or upgrade aging components. Advanced and costly hardening treatments, such as moving away from standard radial configurations toward advanced auto-looping with integrated smart switches, are being considered by some disaster-prone utilities [78] . In this model, when a system is hardened, the fraction of customers who lose power is adjusted (lowered) according to the extent of the hardening.
Because ABMs like ours involve significant assumptions and simplifications regarding human behavior, sensitivity analyses were performed to capture the effects of variations in these assumptions on the model output. This is done by both changing the model's structure (e.g., adding a neighbor scenario) and by repeatedly changing parameter values and rerunning the ABM. Complete model validation would require extensive historic household data on power outages and generator purchases. Because these data have not been collected and because the intent of our study is to understand potential impacts of individual behavior on power outage risk, we rely on sensitivity analysis to evaluate the validity of our model assumptions.
The model is looped M times to reflect an M-year synthetic record and the entire M-year synthetic history is simulated repeatedly until convergence criteria are met.
I V. C A SE ST U DY
A realistic case study is built primarily to demonstrate the types of analyses that can be conducted by the model described in Section III and also to test a small subset of possible hypotheses. A key advantage of agent-based models is provided by the tuning parameters. They may generate scenarios that result in unexpected outcomes, and, in some cases, demonstrate how small adjustments to some parameters may produce large effects.
There are two ways to measure customers without power: 1) the sum of all customers who lost power, regardless of their generator status; and 2) the sum of all customers who lost power less the number of customers who lost power but own a generator. Both are tracked to reflect how the utility performs and how customers fair.
A small portion of scenarios and results are presented. These are intended to reflect the types of hypotheses this model can explore. Additionally, some sensitivity analyses are presented to demonstrate how robust the outcomes are to changes to parameters. However, the number presented represent relatively few of all possible analyses. More scenarios and sensitivity analyses should be explored when examining a real system.
A. Case Study Region
Household data from nine counties in the State of Maryland were collected for the case study. These counties are located in southern and eastern regions of Maryland and touch the Chesapeake Bay (Fig. 2) . In total, 357 000 electric-power customers (households) reside in this region. Publically available tax-assessor data are used to spatially locate each house and to assign each house a value [80] . Anne Arundel County is the most populated and is mostly suburban. Ocean City, in Worcester County, has dense housing. The remainder of the region is either suburban or rural. The value of the property is used as a proxy for wealth, with the assumption being that a wealthier agent is more likely to buy a generator. No agents own a generator when the model is initialized.
The State of Maryland experiences a hurricane every 11-13 years on average [81] . The majority of those storms are of Category 1 strength or below by the time they impact the region. Hurricane intensity tends to be greatest in the southern-most counties, and especially Somerset and Worcester Counties.
A 50-year record is used and convergence is determined via the total number of customers to lose power. A 90% confidence level with a relative error of 10% required, approximately, 125 iterations for each set of parameters.
B. Availability Bias
One's experience during and after a recent hazard can induce mitigation behavior, regardless of how mild or strong their experience up to that hazard has been [82] . This results from an availability bias where beliefs depend on events that are easy to recall, typically because of their recentness [83] . This implies that individuals do not always use their entire risk understanding when making the choice and may underestimate their risk. In this test, the effect of this type of availability is compared to agents who are unbiased in their response. In this case, an unbiased agent is one who buys a generator when they believe their risk of outages is sufficiently high based on his or her experience. From a policy stance, this type of tradeoff analysis may assist officials in determining whether encouraging mitigation on a yearly basis is beneficial.
In this test, the unbiased case is tested under the following conditions: 1) no information campaigns are disseminated, so agents use historical observations to estimate their likelihood of an outage; and 2) an effective information campaign is distributed yearly, so agents use their true likelihood of an outage when making the decision to purchase a generator. Under the bias case, an agent buys a generator if he or she has had at least two outages in the past five years. In order to focus on mitigation, no complaints are made and no hardening occurs. Wealth is not a factor in deciding to buy a generator. The results that follow use the current climate scenario. Fig. 3 shows the distribution over all replications of the cumulative number of outages over the 50-year synthetic history. The gray plot reflects an unbiased case with no information campaign and the orange plot reflects the same, except with yearly information campaign. The blue plot reflects the availability-biased case. These first three distributions do not include outages that are prevented because of a generator. The green distribution reflects all outages, regardless of generator ownership. This last distribution is identical in all cases because no hardening is ever conducted.
The results may surprise some. The scenario where agents' beliefs about outages perfectly align with their true risk due to an information campaign (orange) produces slightly more outages than the scenario where agents rely on their experience to form beliefs (gray). In the case with information, agents who are going to purchase generators do so at the first opportunity that they have, thus reducing the cumulative outages. In the case where no information is disseminated, more generators are purchased overall, and the time when they are purchased, on average, is later than the former case. The reason for this is that given the stochastic nature of hurricanes, there are occasions when agents overestimate their risk, especially when strong hurricanes occur in rapid succession which "artificially" increases agent's Bayesian beliefs regarding their likelihood of one or more outages. When this overestimate is above their risk tolerance, they buy a generator.
Agents who possess availability bias are motivated to purchase generators, but not at the same rate as the other cases. Under this climate scenario, hurricanes intense enough to cause significant outages occur infrequently in close succession. This may leave agents unprepared for future storms. Fortunately, it does appear to cut the cumulative total of outages in the extreme scenarios in half. In reviewing Fig. 3 , the scenario where agents are unbiased with no information yields the least variability in resulting customers without power. In this scenario, a large number of replications result in approximately half a million customers without power. More variation is observed in the results of the unbiased with information and biased scenarios, indicating that the results of these scenarios are more greatly influenced by the agent's behavioral response to the stochastic hurricane simulation than in the unbiased with no information scenario.
C. A Changing Climate
While significant uncertainty remains, the general consensus is that hurricanes in the Atlantic basin will become more intense and less frequent in the future. The number of customers limits the number of outages in any region and the number of customers in the model is assumed to be fixed. It is possible, for example, that a more intense environment will have little impact if the region is already highly vulnerable to outages (e.g., [65] ). In order to simulate the possible effects of a changing climate, we examined one future climate scenario in which the frequency of storms is doubled (Fig. 4) and another scenario where the frequency of storms declines (to 75% as frequent) while the typical storm is 50% more intense (Fig. 5) . The same set of scenarios from Section IV-B are used for these simulations. We chose these climate scenarios to evaluate the impact of this sort of significant change in climate assumptions on our model, not to attempt to simulate the more likely future climate scenario.
The discussion begins with Fig. 4 , where the frequency is doubled. When more hurricanes occur, the count of the total number of outages that includes those who own a generator (green) increases significantly; the mean of the distribution approximately doubles and the variance decreases. The mean of the distribution for the number of outages less those agents with a generator for the bias case (blue) is approximately the same as the current climate scenario, though the variance is narrower. Under the more intense climate, there are simply more occasions of multiple hurricanes happening in rapid succession. This leads agents to believe they are at higher risk for outages. The importance of this is especially notable in the beginning of the study period. When more hurricanes happen initially, agents buy a generator earlier and are not counted later as experiencing an outage. This contributes to the variance reduction.
The unbiased scenario with information dissemination (orange) eclipses the scenario without information dissemination (gray); slightly more agents buy a generator in the former but the timing in which they make the purchase is the difference. Here, the agents who ultimately buy a generator, because their actual risk is greater than what they can tolerate, do so the first opportunity they have. In the other case, even an underestimate of risk may result an agent purchasing a generator if the underestimate is above their risk threshold. However, on average, they recognize that their risk tolerance is exceeded later. When the frequency is reduced and the intensity increased by 50% (Fig. 5) , the mean total number of outages, including those at houses with a generator (green), does not significantly increase over the current climate scenario (Fig. 3) . However, the variance increases considerably. The larger variance is primarily linked to experiencing fewer but more intense storms-two phenomena that produce opposite consequences.
The biased case (blue) causes slightly more outages on average compared to the current climate scenarios. This is in part due to more severe storms, which make some people lose power who typically would not under the current climate. Additionally, storms are spaced further apart on average, making it relatively rare for an agent to "remember" the last outage. That leads them to be more vulnerable to outages in the future because their bias only uses more recent information. The unbiased cases produce results that are close to the baseline conditions. This suggests that under these conditions, the behavioral response to outages-purchasing a generator once the threat is computed to be above one's threshold-can compensate for the additional hazard.
D. Collective Versus Individual Action
Even small contingents of agents who purchase generators reduce the overall all demand for system hardening. This could lead to a situation whereby those agents who can afford to mitigate do, and the consequences for poorer agents are not expected to improve. This tradeoff is demonstrated via the following scenarios: one where no one buys a generator and another where agents whose house is valued at least at the median for the region and who have a moderate tolerance of one or more outages buy a generator. The threshold for filing a complaint is kept low to focus on the effects of declining collective action due people engaging in individual action. No information is distributed and the utility is required to harden when at least 50% of agents file a complaint. Reliability improvements of 5% and 20% are tested. The current climate scenario is used. Fig. 6 shows density plots over the set of simulations for the cumulative number of agents to lose power, including those agents who own and rely on generators. The left shows results from the case where agents do not buy generators.
The plot on the right shows the same, except that agents whose home is valued above the region's median consider buying a generator. The gray distributions show the results when no hardening is conducted; the plots are identical in both figures. 1.3 million outages are expected in the study region over the time frame, though the distribution is wide. The orange and blue plots show the results from a 5% and 20% improvement in system performance, respectively.
When the hardening is modest at 5%, having a significant fraction of the population consider purchasing a generator does not substantially subtract from the efforts of collective action. In this situation, 5% improvement is not significant enough to dramatically alter the risk landscape, even after a few hardening episodes. It is not that the number of people participating in collective action is maintained (it is not), but that system improvement is inadequate, at 5%, to see a substantive reduction to outages. When the system is improved by 20%, the benefits are obvious, especially when significant collective action is present (left on left). In addition to a reduction in the number of outages, which itself is not surprising, the variance is greatly reduced. In the case where no one buys a generator, the number of outages in the extreme right tail is only slightly more than the mean of cumulative outages in the case where half the population considers purchasing a generator and no hardening is conducted.
A final note on the plot on the left in which no generators are purchased: The average number of times that collective action induces hardening when the improvement is 5% is 5 times. The average number of times when the improvement is 20% is 2.6 times. This suggests that only a couple of significant improvements to the system can dramatically reduce grievance rates and alter the reliability compared to multiple minor improvements.
E. Influence of Neighbors
One's neighbors and local community often have significant influence over mitigation and preparation behavior. The act of mitigating sends a signal to others in the community of how an individual perceives his or her risk and may trigger others to follow. This is tested in the following manner. In all cases, all agents are allowed to buy generators. The first case is the base case and neighbors have no effect. In the second case, those who would otherwise buy a generator (because of their beliefs and confidence about the risk of one or more outages) refrain if they have a neighbor within 15 m of their house with a generator. The thought is that they would be able to free-ride and use a neighbor's power if needed. However, if they have relied on their neighbor at least twice in the previous ten years, they buy a generator. In the third case, agents buy generators as they would otherwise, based on beliefs and confidence in their beliefs. In addition, they buy a generator if at least 50% of their neighbors within 75 m own a generator. The final case combines the second and the third. This type of analysis can illuminate a type of emergent behavior-where agent behavior instantaneously propagates-and can only be seen from this type of bottom-up approach. In this set of cases, agents buy a generator if they believe they have a moderate likelihood of outages. No hardening is conducted. Fig. 7 provides results for the cumulative number of outages excluding outages where agents own a generator. The gray plot demonstrates a scenario where agents do not influence one another. The orange plot represents the first neighbor case, where agents are deterred from buying a generator if a close neighbor owns one. The blue plot represents the second neighbor case, where agents are encouraged to buy a generator when at least 50% of their neighbors within 100 m owns one.
All three cases perform approximately the same suggesting that the influence of neighbors would need to be more significant to have a more pronounced effect. However, the right extreme of the three plots highlight the differences. In the first neighbor case, there are more realizations where much higher than average outages are experienced. This is due to free-riding and prevents agents from acting. In the second neighbor case, there are fewer realizations than the other cases. However, it is not significant. In this case, an agent's perception of the risk is fairly aligned with its neighbors because of spatial proximity, meaning they often similarly engage in mitigation. Future iterations of this model could consider a more complex approach for modeling risk perception and preferences.
F. Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis is arguably the key component for deriving maximal benefit from ABMs. It allows the analyst to quantify the degree to which marginal changes to parameters-which, in reality, may be random variables-and small changes to model structure affect system outcomes. This, in turn, shows which parameters and model structure are driving the system and which lack substantive influence. This is important not only for behavior models but also for other probabilistic, physical phenomenon. This subsection reexamines a portion of that discussed in Section IV-D. Specifically, the threshold for filing a grievance and the degree to which system hardening reduces the likelihood of experiencing an outage are perturbed to quantify the significance of these parameters. In this set of experiments, the threshold for filing a grievance is raised to a moderate level (i.e., the threshold is set to near the middle of the observed range of agents' beliefs for an outages) and then the effectiveness of hardening is perturbed, such that hardening has no impact or decreases the likelihood of an outage by 10%, 15%, or 35%. This will assess the influence of both hardening and behavior, and particularly, whether filing grievances and hardening in combination are impactful. This is especially valuable, because to date, the link between hardening and reduction in the likelihood of outages has not been studied in a statistical sense. In these sets of scenarios, the current climate condition is used, no generators are purchased, and no information is disseminated. As in Section IV-D, once 50% of agents file a grievance, the system is hardened. Fig. 8 shows the results for the case where the threshold for filing a grievance is moderate and for the 0% (gray), 10% (orange), 15% (blue), and 35% (green) hardening scenarios. The gray plots in Figs. 6 and 8 are identical. The orange plot in Fig. 8 has fewer outages on average and the distribution has a lower variance than the comparable orange plot in Fig. 6 (left) . This is interesting because an improvement to 10% has significant impact on the system despite a fewer number of occasions in which hardening is conducted. This is because hardening leads to fewer outages which makes agents less likely to file a grievance and agents have a higher threshold before they file a grievance.
Returning solely to Fig. 8 , it is apparent that as hardening becomes more effective, the expected number of outages declines. However, the marginal decline between 10% and 15% (orange and blue) is nearly identical to the decline between 15% and 35% (blue and green), even though the change in the productivity of hardening in the latter scenario is more substantial. The reason follows. When hardening improves from 10% to 15%, the effect on the number of outages is initially modest in the runs. However, because the effect is only modest, agents are likely to file a grievance again, and with enough mass, system hardening is conducted again. This is not true when hardening improves from 15% to 35%. The effect from the first instance of hardening is significant, but fewer agents are likely to file grievances in the future. It is atypical hardening is conducted once again. This demonstrates the importance of not only hardening, but the cycle of hardening and the agents' behavioral response to changes in the system.
V. CONCLUSION
Hurricanes cause widespread and prolonged electric-power outages. The presumption is often that a utility's reliability is a result of its unique hazard landscape and managerial decisions. The framework developed in this paper additionally shows how customers' behavioral response may have a role in shaping this risk landscape. The framework is particularly powerful because its structure is grounded in the social science literature and it does not necessarily have intensive data requirements. Numerous hypotheses can be explored via sensitivity analyses to see how small changes to the system could produce macrolevel changes. This has the opportunity to provide substantive insight for regulators, operators, and other decision makers on how the regional risk may evolve over time. 
